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I. Introduction 
One of the most basic and widely accepted principles of 
political governance is that that the state is justified in 
promulgating laws to protect individuals from harm by others.1 
The state’s power to legislate and protect against a variety of 
                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis, 
MN. Teresa Stanton Collett, Fetal Pain Legislation: Is It Viable?, 30 PEPP. L. 
REV. 161 (2003). 
 1. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“[A]ll 
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among 
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . . .”). 
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harms, including the harm of being made to suffer physical pain, 
has been recognized in both domestic2 and international law.3 
“The Government of course has an obligation to protect its 
citizens from harm.”4 The exercise of this power is up to the 
prudential judgment of our state and national legislatures, 
however, and is not a constant constitutional imperative.5  
This power of protection encompasses all living creatures,6 as 
well as developing fetal human life.7 Thirteen states and the 
House of Representatives have passed legislation that strictly 
limits abortions during the second half of the pregnancy, 
generally after nineteen weeks gestation,8 to protect the 
developing human person from pain.9 These laws, known as Pain-
                                                                                                     
 2. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2012) (criminalizing and defining torture as 
“an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended 
to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or 
suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody 
or physical control”). 
 3. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a94.html (“Each State 
Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures 
to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.”). 
 4. Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961). 
 5. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
195 (1989) (rejecting a claim against local child-protection officials who, after 
notice of possible abuse, failed to protect a child from beatings by his father that 
left the child severely brain damaged).  
 6. See HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BRIEF SUMMARIES OF 
FEDERAL ANIMAL PROTECTION STATUTES (2009), http://www.animallaw.info/ 
articles/art_pdf/aruscohen2009fedlawsummaries.pdf (listing federal animal 
protection statutes and providing an overview of each). 
 7. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992) 
(recognizing the state’s potentially paramount interest in protecting fetal life 
without limitation to Roe’s trimester categories). 
 8. ALA. CODE § 26-23B-5(a) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1304(a) (2012); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2159(b) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141(c)(1) 
(2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-505 (2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1(a) (2012); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6724(c)(2) (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.30.1(E)(1) 
(2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-3,106 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-45.1 (2012); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-05.3(3) (2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-745.5(A) 
(2012); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.044 (2013); Pain-Capable 
Unborn Child Protection Act, H.R. 1797, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 9. See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 
735–36 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (upholding a South Dakota law requiring that 
women be informed that abortion ends the “life of a whole, separate, unique, 
living human being,” and finding that opponents of the definition provided “no 
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Capable Child Protection Acts, strictly limit abortion after the 
point of gestation when the unborn child has developed the 
capacity to feel pain during the process of an abortion.10  
Proponents argue that protecting an unborn child from such 
pain is a natural extension of the long tradition in American law 
prohibiting acts that inflict unwarranted suffering on human 
beings and other sentient creatures.11 Opponents argue that such 
laws are based on scientific speculation and inflammatory 
rhetoric.12 Given the large number of states adopting Pain-
Capable Child Protection Acts, it is no surprise that these 
arguments are now before federal courts. This Article explores 
the arguments supporting the existence of fetal pain and the 
constitutionality of abortion limits at twenty weeks gestation. 
II. Fetal Pain and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban 
The question of whether and when the unborn child feels 
pain is not new. Since the early 1980s, there has been extensive 
                                                                                                     
evidence to the oppose that conclusion”). 
 10. See David F. Forte, Life, Heartbeat, Birth: A Medical Basis for Reform, 
74 OHIO ST. L.J. 121, 134 (2013) (“[S]tates have passed a version of the Pain-
Capable Unborn Child Protection Act. The Act prohibits abortion after twenty 
weeks of pregnancy based on the State’s assessment of medical evidence that 
the unborn child could experience pain as early as twenty weeks.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 11. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Fetal Pain Legislation: Is It Viable?, 30 
PEPP. L. REV. 161, 171 (2003) [hereinafter Collett, Fetal Pain Legislation] 
(discussing the history of abortion laws enacted to “minimize fetal suffering”); 
Katherine E. Engelman, Fetal Pain Legislation: Protection Against Pain Is Not 
an Undue Burden, 10 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 279, 312 (2007) (explaining that 
the government “also regulate[s] the pain inflicted on other sentient creatures 
such as laboratory animals and livestock”); Kevin Walsh, Note, The Science, 
Law and Politics of Fetal Pain, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2031–32 (2002) (noting 
other areas of law, specifically animal cruelty, where reform occurred to prevent 
other sentient beings from suffering). 
 12. See, e.g., Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: 
Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 
111, 152 (2008) (“Statements about fetal pain currently in place in several states 
are questionably accurate and clearly misleading.”); Lindsay J. Calhoun, 
Comment, The Painless Truth: Challenging Fetal Pain-Based Abortion Bans, 87 
TUL. L. REV. 141, 151 (2012) (“[A]s detractors have noted, the language of the 
legislative findings is extremely misleading with regard to medical support and 
certainty.” (footnote omitted)). 
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debate about whether the unborn experience pain during 
abortion.13 President Reagan brought this issue squarely into 
public view in 1984 when he said, “when the lives of the unborn 
are snuffed out [by abortion], they often feel pain, pain that is 
long and agonizing.”14 This debate reemerged and intensified 
when the world caught a glimpse of life within the womb through 
the picture of Samuel Armas’s tiny hand apparently grasping the 
finger of his perinatal surgeon who was repairing Samuel’s spine 
when he was only twenty-one weeks in gestation.15  
The debate over fetal pain made its way into the courts after 
the passage of state and federal bans of a procedure commonly 
known as “partial-birth abortion.”16 In ruling on the 
constitutionality of the federal ban, Judge Richard C. Casey, 
sitting in the Southern District of New York, called the procedure 
“gruesome, brutal, barbaric, and uncivilized.”17 He found that 
                                                                                                     
 13. See Engelman, supra note 11, at 281 (discussing the debate about fetal 
pain). 
 14. Ronald Reagan, U.S. President, Address to the National Religious 
Broadcasters Convention (Jan. 30, 1984), available at http://www.american 
rhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreagannrbroadcasters.htm; see also John T. 
Noonan, Jr., The Experience of Pain by the Unborn, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON 
HUMAN ABORTION 205, 205 (Thomas W. Hilgers et al. eds., 1981) (“One aspect of 
the abortion question which has not been adequately investigated is the pain 
experienced by the object of an abortion.”); Cristine Russell, Physician Group 
Supports President on Fetus Pain: Human Nervous System Early Development 
in Life, Group of Abortion Opponents Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1984, at A6 
(“Twenty-six physicians wrote President Reagan yesterday in support of his 
recent statement that fetuses often suffer ‘long and agonizing’ pain during 
abortion.”). 
 15.  History or Hoax, MICHAEL CLANCY, http://www.michaelclancy.com/ 
index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2014) (discussing the photograph of Samuel 
Armas and providing the famous photograph) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 16.  
The federal partial-birth abortion ban prohibits a physician from 
deliberately and intentionally vaginally deliver[ing] a living fetus 
until, in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is 
outside the body of the mother, or, in the case of breech presentation, 
any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the 
mother, for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person 
knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus. 
18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(A) (2012); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 142 
(2007) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1531). 
 17. Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
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abortion procedures “subject fetuses to severe pain.”18 In contrast, 
Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton of the Northern District of California 
arrived at a different conclusion. She wrote that “much of the 
debate on this issue is based on speculation and inference”19 and 
that “the issue of whether fetuses feel pain is unsettled in the 
scientific community.”20 These divergent conclusions illustrate 
the key factual battle involved in challenges to Pain-Capable 
Child Protection Acts—when does the unborn child develop the 
capacity to feel pain? 
III. Defining Our Terms 
Before attempting to answer the questions of “whether” and 
“when” an unborn child or human fetus “feels pain,” it is 
necessary to establish what the words “feels” and “pain” mean in 
this context.21 Much of the disagreement on the existence and 
extent of the unborn child’s pain can be explained by the absence 
of a common definition of these key terms. There are three 
competing definitions of “fetal pain” arising from whether “feels” 
means to have a “conscious appreciation of” or merely 
“experience,” and from the question of how such appreciation or 
experience can be ascertained. 
A. Conscious Appreciation 
Some physicians and scientists restrictively define “feels” to 
mean only those responses that reflect some self-awareness or 
“conscious appreciation of pain.”22 “Pain is a subjective sensory 
                                                                                                     
 18. Id. 
 19. Planned Parenthood Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 997 (N.D. 
Cal. 2004). 
 20. Id. at 1002. 
 21. Adrian R. Lloyd-Thomas & Maria Fitzgerald, Reflex Responses Do Not 
Necessarily Signify Pain, 313 BRIT. MED. J. 797, 797 (1996), available at 
http://www.bmj.com/content/313/7060/797. 
 22. See Stuart W.G. Derbyshire, Can Fetuses Feel Pain?, 332 BRIT. MED. J. 
909, 911 (2006), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC 
1440624/ (“Without consciousness there can be nociception but there cannot be 
pain.”); David James Mellor et al., Fetal “Awareness” and “Pain”: What 
Precautions Should Be Taken to Safeguard Fetal Welfare During Experiments?, 
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and emotional experience that requires the presence of 
consciousness to permit recognition of a stimulus as 
unpleasant.”23 In the absence of consciousness, they argue that 
the most researchers can conclude from the medical and scientific 
evidence is that the human fetus “reacts to physical 
stimulation.”24  
Whether the fetus feels pain, however, hinges not on its 
biological development but on its conscious development. 
Unless it can be shown that the fetus has a conscious 
appreciation of pain after 26 weeks, then the responses to 
noxious stimulation must still essentially be reflex, exactly as 
before 26 weeks.25 
                                                                                                     
SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS ON ALTERNATIVES & ANIMAL USE LIFE SCI. PROC., Mar. 
31, 2008, at 79, 80, available at http://www.slideshare.net/ SDRTL/fetal-
awareness-and-pain (“For a living animal to experience pain and to suffer as a 
result it must . . . have a nervous system that is sophisticated enough . . . . [and] 
[i]t must be conscious—an animal cannot suffer while it is unconscious.”); 
Zbigniew Szawarski, Probably No Pain in the Absence of “Self”, 313 BRIT. MED. 
J. 796, 796 (1996), available at http://www.bmj.com/content/313/7060/796.2 
(“Thus pain has a dual nature. As a subjective, conscious feeling it is always my 
pain happening inside or on my body and nobody else can experience it.”). 
 23. Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary Review 
of the Evidence, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 947, 948 (2005), available at 
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=201429; see also Carlo 
Valerio Bellieni & Giuseppe Buonocore, Is Fetal Pain a Real Evidence?, 25 J. 
MATERNAL-FETAL & NEONATAL MED. 1203, 1205 (2012) (“Our data show that 
there is consistent evidence of the possibility for the fetus to experience pain in 
the third trimester, and this evidence is weaker before this date and null in the 
first half of pregnancy.”); ROYAL COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNAECOLOGISTS, 
FETAL AWARENESS: REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
11 (2010) [hereinafter FETAL AWARENESS], http://www.rcog.org.uk/files/rcog-
corp/RCOGFetalAwarenessWPR0610.pdf (“The lack of cortical connections 
before 24 weeks . . . implies that pain is not possible until after 24 weeks. Even 
after 24 weeks, there is continuing development and elaboration of intracortical 
networks.”). 
 24. See Hugh Muir, When Does Pain Begin?, THE DAILY TEL., Sept. 28, 
1996, at 8 
Groups such as the Birth Control Trust, whose director Ann Furedi 
co-wrote one of the papers, admit that the foetus reacts to physical 
stimulation, such as procedures involving needles, from around 12 to 
14 weeks. They agree that stress levels can rise in these 
circumstances. But they argue that the mere reaction to physical 
stimuli does not automatically indicate the feeling of pain. 
See also Lee et al., supra note 23, at 947 (“[P]ain perception probably does not 
function before the third trimester.”). 
 25. Stuart Derbyshire & Ann Furedi, “Fetal Pain” Is a Misnomer, 313 BRIT. 
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This reasoning was embraced by the federal district court in 
Women’s Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich.26 The court 
concluded that the state could not justify a ban on partial-birth 
abortion, as preventing unnecessary cruelty to the fetus, due to 
the absence of medical testimony that the fetus “experiences a 
conscious awareness of pain.”27 In essence, the court reasoned 
that absent evidence that the fetus had “mindful awareness” of 
noxious stimuli,28 there can be no pain, and in the absence of 
pain, there can be no cruelty.29 
                                                                                                     
MED. J. 795, 795 (1996), available at http://www.bmj.com/content/313/ 
7060/795.2; see also FETAL AWARENESS, supra note 23, at 11 (“[T]he cortex is 
necessary for pain perception; cortical activation correlates strongly with pain 
experience and an absence of cortical activity generally indicates an absence of 
pain experience. The lack of cortical connections before 24 weeks, therefore, 
implies that pain is not possible until after 24 weeks.”). 
 26. See Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1074 
(S.D. Ohio 1995) (“Until medical science advances to a point at which the 
determination of when a fetus becomes ‘conscious’ can be made within a 
reasonable degree of certainty, neither doctors nor judges nor legislators can 
definitively state . . . when the fetus becomes aware of pain.”). 
 27. Id. In Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), Justice Kennedy 
provided a layperson’s description of partial-birth abortion or the D & X 
procedure: 
In the D & X, the abortionist initiates the woman’s natural delivery 
process by causing the cervix of the woman to be dilated, sometimes 
over a sequence of days. The fetus’ arms and legs are delivered 
outside the uterus while the fetus is alive; witnesses to the procedure 
report seeing the body of the fetus moving outside the woman’s body. 
At this point, the abortion procedure has the appearance of a live 
birth . . . . With only the head of the fetus remaining in utero, the 
abortionist tears open the skull. According to Dr. Martin Haskell, a 
leading proponent of the procedure, the appropriate instrument to be 
used at this stage of the abortion is a pair of scissors. Witnesses 
report observing the portion of the fetus outside the woman react to 
the skull penetration. The abortionist then inserts a suction tube and 
vacuums out the developing brain and other matter found within the 
skull. The process of making the size of the fetus’ head smaller is 
given the clinically neutral term “reduction procedure.” Brain death 
does not occur until after the skull invasion, and, according to Dr. 
Carhart, the heart of the fetus may continue to beat for minutes after 
the contents of the skull are vacuumed out. The abortionist next 
completes the delivery of a dead fetus, intact except for the damage to 
the head and the missing contents of the skull. 
Id. at 959–60 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 28. Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp., 911 F. Supp. at 1073. 
 29. Id. at 1074; see also Interview by Bob Abernethy with Peter Singer, 
Professor, Princeton Univ., in Religion & Ethics Newsweekly (PBS television 
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B. Behavioral and Physiological Responses 
Other physicians and scientists have rejected the 
requirement of consciousness as a predicate to the experience of 
pain. These doctors argue that observed physiological30 and 
behavioral responses31 to noxious stimuli are reliable indicators of 
pain, particularly for those individuals who are not capable of the 
self-reporting.32 Even those who deny the existence of fetal pain 
prior to self-consciousness concede unborn children respond to 
painful stimuli at or before eighteen weeks of gestation:  
It is known that the fetus withdraws from a needle from about 
18 weeks and also launches a stress response following needle 
puncture. The stress response includes the release of 
hormones and neurotransmitters dependent on activity in 
areas of the midbrain. These findings confirm that signals 
about tissue damage are transmitted from the spinal cord and 
brainstem to the midbrain from at least 18 weeks.33 
Physicians and scientists recognizing the existence of fetal 
pain prior to viability argue that absent the ability to self-report, 
physical evidence of pain-like responses should be viewed as 
“infantile forms of self-report and should not be discounted as 
‘surrogate measures’ of pain.”34 While conceding the lack of 
                                                                                                     
broadcast Sept. 10, 1999) (“Killing a newborn baby—whether able-bodied or 
not—I think, is never equivalent to killing a being who wants to go on living. It’s 
different. It’s still—almost always wrong, but it’s different.”). 
 30. Physiological changes include changes in heart rate or the increased 
production of stress hormones. PARLIAMENTARY OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH., FETAL 
AWARENESS 3 (1997), available at http://www.parliament.uk/business/publica 
tions/research/briefing-papers/POST-PN-94/fetal-awarenesspost-note94. 
 31. Behavioral changes include withdrawal of affected body parts, crying, 
and facial expressions. Id. 
 32. See K.J.S. Anand & Kenneth D. Craig, Editorial: New Perspectives on 
the Definition of Pain, 67 PAIN 3, 3 (1996) (stating that “[b]ecause self-report 
may be absent or a faulty source of inference, nonverbal behavioral information 
is often needed and used for pain assessment”); Am. Acad. of Pediatrics et al., 
Prevention and Management of Pain in the Neonate: An Update, 118 PEDIATRICS 
2231, 2231–32 (2006), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/ 
content/118/5/2231.full.html (noting long-term adverse effects of pain on 
development of neonates). 
 33. FETAL AWARENESS, supra note 23, at 5. 
 34. Anand & Craig, supra note 32, at 5; see also Vivette Glover & Nicholas 
Fisk, We Don’t Know Better; Better to Err on the Safe Side from Mid-gestation, 
313 BRIT. MED. J. 796, 796 (1996) (arguing that fetal stress responses may be 
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perfect correspondence between behavioral and physiological 
indicia and the actual experience of pain, these physicians and 
scientists note that self-reports of pain and the actual experience 
of pain also lack a perfect correspondence.35 They argue that the 
burden of proof is on those who deny the existence of fetal pain in 
the face of the physical evidence, rather than upon those who 
seek to respond to the evidence by attempting to alleviate pain.36 
C. Neurological Development37 
Those subscribing to the view that fetal pain should be 
presumed in cases involving physiological and behavioral 
responses regularly refer to the development of the fetal nervous 
system to reinforce their argument. The spinal cord and brain 
develop within the human embryo’s neural tube, which forms 
within the first two or three weeks of gestation.38 Within the first 
                                                                                                     
the best indices of pain currently available). 
 35. See Anand & Craig, supra note 32, at 3 (describing self-reports as a 
“faulty source of inference”). 
 36. See Mark Owens, Pain in Infancy: Conceptual and Methodological 
Issues, 20 PAIN 213, 215 (1984)  
If the assumption that infants experience pain is correct, then the 
benefits are measured by a decrease in needless human suffering. The 
cost of a mistaken assumption of infant pain would be to waste the 
effort. Costs and benefits come down squarely on the side of assuming 
that infants do experience pain. The burden of proof should be shifted 
to those who maintain that infants do not feel pain. 
See also Sampsa Vanhatalo & Onno van Nieuwenhuizen, Fetal Pain?, 22 BRAIN 
& DEV. 145, 149 (2000) (stating that the proper response to evidence of fetal 
response to noxious stimuli is to avoid or treat any possibly noxious stimuli 
rather than speculate on the possible emotional experiences of pain by the fetus 
or neonate); John Wyatt, When Do We Begin to Feel the Pain?, GUARDIAN, Oct. 
24, 1996, at 2 
While responsible scientists have a duty to emphasise what they don’t 
know, doctors have a duty of care that should lead them to err on the 
side of caution. If there is a possibility of lasting harm, we must act in 
the best interests of our patients even when the evidence is 
ambiguous. We should, in the words of Glover [a clinical scientist in 
the psychobiology group at Queen Charlotte’s and Chelsea Hospital in 
London], ‘give the foetus the benefit of the doubt,’ and extend the use 
of effective pain relief to surgical procedures before birth. 
 37. The language and content of Part III.C draw substantially from Collett, 
Fetal Pain Legislation, supra note 11, at 165–68.  
 38. PARLIAMENTARY OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH., supra note 30, at 2. 
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four weeks following conception, the primitive structures of the 
brain are recognizable.39 The internal structure of the brain 
continues to develop throughout the pregnancy and during the 
first year of infancy into a complex structure that regulates many 
distinct physical processes.40 
 In addition to the brain and spinal cord, the human nervous 
system consists of an intricate network of peripheral receptors 
and transmitters.41 The receptors specifically involved in 
discerning pain are called nociceptors.42 Nociceptors are naked 
nerve endings that lie free in the skin, with their cell bodies in 
the dorsal root ganglia.43 They respond to pressure stimuli, 
thermal stimuli, and chemical stimuli, and transmit their sensory 
signals through the spinal cord to the brain via cutaneous nerve 
fibers.44 The network of nociceptors and fibers develops in the 
period from seven to twenty weeks’ gestation, beginning in the 
skin of the face, then to the palms of the hands and soles of the 
feet, until it covers the entire body.45 The fibers link to the central 
nervous system through a network of synapse-like connections to 
the cells of the fetal dorsal horn in the spinal cord.46 Neural and 
chemical connections transmit the impulses received by the 
dorsal horn to the brain.47 
                                                                                                     
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. See FETAL AWARENESS, supra note 23, at 3–4 (“Nociceptors are sensory 
nerve terminals found in the skin and internal organs that convert tissue 
damage into electrical signals. The pattern and strength of these nociceptor 
signals is the first determining step in generating pain.”). 
 43. J.A. Rushford, Pain Perception, in FETAL & NEONATAL NEUROLOGY & 
NEUROSURGERY 601, 601 (Malcolm I. Levine & Richard J. Lilford, Sr. eds., 2d ed. 
1995). 
 44. See id. (“Two types of dermal nociceptor exist: high threshold 
mechanoreceptors (HTMs), which respond to pressure and transmit impulses 
. . . and polymodal receptors (PMNs), which respond to pressure, thermal and 
chemical stimuli.”). 
 45. K.J.S. Anand & D.B. Carr, The Neuroanatomy, Neuophysiology, and 
Neurochemistry of Pain, Stress and Analgesia in Newborns and Children, 36 
PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 795, 798 (1989); Roland Brusseau, Developmental 
Perpectives: Is the Fetus Conscious?, 46 INT’L ANESTHESIOLOGY CLINICS 11, 14 
(2008); Vanhatalo & Nieuwenhuizen, supra note 36, at 146. 
 46. Rushford, supra note 43, at 602. 
 47. K.J.S. Anand & P.J. McGrath, The Applied Physiology of Pain, in PAIN 
IN NEONATES 39, 40 (1993). 
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As the brain receives the impulses, they enter the 
thalamus.48 The thalamus registers the impulse and, if it 
identifies the impulse as one of organic pain, this portion of the 
brain sends physiological signals to the motor nerves to initiate 
the body’s complex reflexive response to pain.49 After 
interconnection, the thalamus can also transmit the initial 
impulse to the cortex of the brain, where complex processing, 
including psychological reaction and directed physical responses, 
takes place.50 Although both the thalamus and cortex are 
recognizable in the basic brain structure from about six weeks’ 
gestation,51 they continue to grow in size and internal structure 
throughout the pregnancy.52 The thalamus, however, develops 
and interconnects with the nervous system much earlier than the 
cortex.53 By twelve weeks of gestation, the thalamus is mature 
enough to receive impulses from the sensory network.54 Only at 
or beyond twenty weeks is the interconnection between the 
thalamus and the cortex sufficiently developed for the cortex to 
receive the impulses transmitted from the network via the 
thalamus.55 
From a neurological development perspective, the key to 
answering the question of whether fetuses experience pain 
                                                                                                     
 48. Id. 
 49. See RICHARD S. SNELL, CLINICAL NEUROANATOMY: A REVIEW WITH 
QUESTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 138 (3d ed. 2001) (“A vast amount of sensory 
information (except smell) converges on the thalamus and is integrated through 
the interconnections between the nuclei. The resulting information pattern is 
distributed to other parts of the central nervous system.”). 
 50. Id. The cerebral cortex is “[a] sheet of densely packed neuronal cells 
which form the outer, folded part of the brain associated with higher functions.” 
FETAL AWARENESS, supra note 23, at vi. 
 51. PARLIAMENTARY OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH., supra note 30, at 2. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. at 1 (stating the fibers of the thalamus “start developing at 17 
weeks” yet do not “penetrate the cortical plate [of the cortex] to make permanent 
connections . . . [until] 22–34 weeks”). 
 54. Id. at 2. 
 55. See MED. RESEARCH COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE MRC EXPERT GROUP ON 
FETAL PAIN § 3.3 (2001), available at http://www.mrc.ac.uk/Utilities/Document 
record/consumption/idcplg?IdcService=GET_FILE&dID=8049&dDocName=MR
C002413&allowInterrupt=1 (“Connections from the thalamus to the cortex begin 
to form at about 20 weeks gestation . . . and continue to mature along with other 
cortical connections well into childhood and adolescence.”). 
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depends primarily upon the development and function of the 
various regions of the brain. Although simple reflex responses are 
observable even after only seven weeks of gestation, the brain is 
not yet involved in the process.56 Without any brain activity, 
there can be no perception of pain, according to the current 
consensus of the medical community.57 But medical opinion 
divides over whether the cortex exclusively controls the human 
fetus’s perception of pain, or whether the thalamus and lower 
brain stem can generate these perceptions.58 
According to some physicians, the earlier development of the 
thalamus and lower brain stem is sufficient for pain perception.59 
Based on evidence obtained by observing anencephalic and 
hydranencephalic infants who have no or minimal cortex 
development, these experts assert that pain perception does not 
depend upon established connections from the thalamus to the 
cortex and can exist after the thalamus establishes its connection 
with the sensory network60:  
                                                                                                     
 56. PARLIAMENTARY OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH., supra note 30, at 1. 
 57. See COMM’N ON INQUIRY INTO FETAL SENTIENCE, HUMAN SENTIENCE 
BEFORE BIRTH § 5.2 (1996), available at http://www.prolifeinfo.ie/am_cms_ 
media/uploaded/d/0e1625729_docacvpainhumansentience-before-birth.doc (“It is 
commonly believed that without the cortex, the large mass of brain involved in 
intricate decision-making, thought and controlled behaviour, there can be no 
experience of pain.”). 
 58. See id. § 5.3 
Professor Fitzgerald claimed that to challenge the idea that the cortex 
was the only region of awareness would challenge “the very basis of 
our understanding of the brain . . . [.] It is a basic acceptance of the 
scientific and medical community that the cortex is the site of 
experience, of understanding, of emotion, of interaction with the 
outside world . . . . The cortex is what makes us into living, reacting, 
individuals.” However, some scientists do challenge this thinking. 
(omissions in original). 
 59. Id. § 5.3.2. 
 60. See id. § 5.3.1 (“[T]he evidence from such children challenges the 
doctrine that the cortex is required for all conscious awareness. The possibility 
is therefore increasing that the fetus could be aware and have consciousness 
once lower structures in the brain are formed.”). “The thalamus (rather than the 
sensory cortex) is thought to be the crucial structure for the perception of some 
types of sensation, especially pain, and the sensory cortex may function to give 
finer detail to the sensation.” STEPHEN G. WAXMAN, CORRELATIVE 
NEUROANATOMY 125 (24th ed. 2000). This conclusion, although distinguishable, 
is consistent with the statement of the American Academy of Pediatrics that 
“[t]he decision [to administer anesthesia to neonates undergoing surgical 
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Despite total or near-total absence of the cortex, these children 
[with hydrocephaly] clearly possess discriminative awareness. 
They distinguish familiar from unfamiliar people and 
environments and are capable of social interaction, visual 
orienting, musical preferences, appropriate affective 
responses, and associative learning. . . . 
Multiple lines of evidence thus corroborate that the key 
mechanism of consciousness or conscious sensory perception 
are not dependent on cortical activity. Consistent with this 
evidence, the responses to noxious stimulation of children with 
hydranencephaly are purposeful, coordinated, and similar to 
those of intact children.61 
Because the thalamus connection to the sensory network can be 
established as early as twelve weeks of gestation, some experts 
would date possible pain perception at twelve to thirteen weeks.62 
Other physicians argue that the cortex–thalamus connection 
is necessary to experience pain.63 Since this connection is 
established at the earliest between twenty and twenty-four weeks 
of gestation, these experts assert that only those fetuses of twenty 
or more weeks of gestation can experience pain.64 
                                                                                                     
procedures] should not be based solely on the infant’s age or perceived degree of 
cortical maturity.” Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Neonatal Anesthesia, 80 PEDIATRICS 
446, 446 (1987), available at http://www.aap.org/policy/01730.html. 
 61. Int’l Ass’n for the Study of Pain, Fetal Pain?, 14 PAIN: CLINICAL 
UPDATES 1, 2 (2006). 
 62. See COMM’N ON INQUIRY INTO FETAL SENTIENCE, supra note 57, § 8.1. See 
also Mary Sheridan & Roger Highfield, Growing Pains, LONDON TELEGRAPH 
(Oct. 12, 2000, 12:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/science-
news/4754496/Growing-pains.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2014) (reporting that 
80% of British neuroscientists responding to a survey believed that the fetus 
should receive pain control after eleven weeks of gestation) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 63. See Lee et al., supra note 23, at 952 (“While the presence of 
thalamocortical fibers is necessary for pain perception, their mere presence is 
insufficient—this pathway must also be functional.”). 
 64. Id.; see also Derbyshire & Furedi, supra note 25, at 912 (stating that 
the “neuroanatomical system for pain can be considered complete by 26 weeks 
gestation”); David J. Mellor et al., The Importance of “Awareness” for 
Understanding Fetal Pain, 49 BRAIN RES. REV. 455, 456 (2005) (“[T]he final 
critical cortico-thalamic connections appear to be present by 24–28 weeks of 
gestation. This suggests that the fetus could potentially be able to feel pain by 
the third trimester, at least in a rudimentary fashion.” (footnotes omitted)); 
Richard P. Smith et al., Pain and Stress in the Human Fetus, 92 EURO. J. 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY & REPROD. BIOLOGY 161, 161–62 (2001) (noting the 
neuroanatomical pathways necessary to feel pain begin to develop at 22 weeks, 
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State legislatures throughout the country have waded into 
the debate between physicians and scientists over these 
questions, with thirteen states concluding that there is 
substantial medical evidence that the unborn can feel pain and 
that abortion should be strictly limited at and after twenty weeks’ 
gestation.65 Courts are now considering whether such legislative 
conclusions provide an adequate basis for statutory bans on 
abortions at twenty weeks’ gestation and later.66 In Gonzales v. 
Carhart,67 the majority noted “[m]edical uncertainty does not 
foreclose the exercise of legislative power in the abortion context 
any more than it does in other contexts.”68 In light of the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of congressional findings regarding 
the partial-birth abortion procedure in Gonzales, it seems likely 
the laws will be upheld.69 
IV. Federal Constitutional Analysis of Abortion Regulation 
In Roe v. Wade,70 the Supreme Court declared that the 
Constitution contained an implicit right to obtain an abortion.71 
The Court characterized the right as the logical extension of 
another implied right—the right to use contraception—which was 
grounded in the implied right to privacy.72 In so holding, however, 
the Court recognized that the abortion decision was unique:  
As we have intimated above, it is reasonable and appropriate 
for a State to decide that at some point in time another 
interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential 
human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman’s 
                                                                                                     
and are complete at 26 weeks). 
 65. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (listing the thirteen state 
statutes). 
 66. See, e.g., supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing a federal 
court decision that addressed a state’s fetal pain statute). 
 67. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 68. Id. at 129. 
 69. See generally Antony B. Kolenc, Easing Abortion’s Pain: Can Fetal Pain 
Legislation Survive the New Judicial Scrutiny of Legislative Fact-Finding?, 10 
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 171 (2005).  
 70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 71. Id. at 153. 
 72. Id. at 152. 
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privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses 
must be measured accordingly.73 
Unlike contraception, abortion involves both the mother and “a 
whole, separate, unique, living human being” that she carries.74  
Roe established what was to become a “rigid trimester 
analysis,” permitting virtually no regulation of abortion during 
the first trimester, and regulations directed only at preserving 
maternal health in the second trimester.75 The state could protect 
unborn human life by prohibiting abortions only in the third 
trimester after the child was “viable” or capable of living outside 
the womb,76 and then only if the abortion was not necessary to 
preserve the life or the health of the mother.77  
This trimester approach to abortion legislation was criticized 
by four members of the Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services78:  
We think that the doubt cast upon the Missouri statute by 
these cases is not so much a flaw in the statute as it is a 
reflection of the fact that the rigid trimester analysis of the 
course of a pregnancy enunciated in Roe has resulted in 
subsequent cases like Colautti and Akron making 
constitutional law in this area a virtual Procrustean bed.79 
                                                                                                     
 73. Id. at 159. 
 74. See Planned Parenthood v. Rounds Minn., N.D., S.D., 530 F.3d 724, 735 
(8th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (upholding a South Dakota law requiring that women 
be informed that abortion ends the “life of a whole, separate, unique, living 
human being,” and finding that opponents of the definition provided “no 
evidence to the contrary”). 
 75. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 517 (1989) (plurality 
opinion). 
 76. A viable fetus is “potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb, 
albeit with artificial aid,” and presumably capable of “meaningful life outside 
the mother’s womb.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160–63 (1973); see also Colautti 
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388 (1979) (“Viability is reached when, in the 
judgment of the attending physician on the particular facts of the case before 
him, there is a reasonable likelihood of the fetus’ sustained survival outside the 
womb, with or without artificial support.”). Medical authorities most commonly 
place viability between twenty-two and twenty-six weeks gestation. MS 
Pignotti, The Definition of Human Viability: A Historical Perspective, 99 ACTA 
PAEDIATRICA 33, 35 (2010). 
 77. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64. 
 78. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 79. Id. at 517. 
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The plurality opinion recognized that the State’s interest in 
protecting fetal life existed throughout the pregnancy: “[W]e do 
not see why the State’s interest in protecting potential human life 
should come into existence only at the point of viability, and that 
there should therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation 
after viability but prohibiting it before viability.”80  
Ultimately the trimester approach was rejected by the Court 
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,81 
because the trimester framework “misconceives the nature of the 
pregnant woman’s interest; and in practice it undervalues the 
State’s interest in potential life, as recognized in Roe.”82 The 
Justices, however, retained fetal viability as a measure of 
constitutional significance.83  
To date, most cases regarding the ability of states to prohibit 
abortions after viability have focused on the method of 
determining viability.84 The existence of this rule, and the Court’s 
acceptance of the state’s compelling interest in protecting viable 
unborn children, however, does not foreclose the establishment of 
a separate and independent state interest in preserving the lives 
of unborn children at the point when they are capable of feeling 
pain.  
V. Fetal Pain as an Independent State Interest 
The Supreme Court has never been asked whether the state’s 
interest in protecting unborn children who have the capacity to 
feel pain is sufficiently compelling to support a limited 
prohibition on abortion. Challenges to Pain-Capable Child 
Protection Acts require courts to determine whether the capacity 
                                                                                                     
 80. Id. at 519. 
 81. 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992). 
 82. Id. at 873. 
 83. See id. at 879 (“[A] State may not prohibit any woman from making the 
ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability.”).  
 84. See, e.g., Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 
1077 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (“[I]t appears that the physician cannot rely solely on his 
or her own best clinical judgment in determining whether a fetus is viable; 
instead, that determination must be objectively reasonable as well, that is, 
reasonable to other physicians, as well as to the physician making the 
determination.” (footnote omitted)). 
PREVIABILITY ABORTION 1227 
to feel pain, independent of fetal viability, is sufficient to sustain 
a limited prohibition on abortion. While opponents argue 
vigorously that the pain capacity of the previable unborn should 
be legally irrelevant,85 there are several indications by various 
members of the Supreme Court that suggest the limited 
protection afforded to pain-capable unborn children may be 
constitutional.86  
Just as the issue of abortion deeply divides the American 
people, abortion cases divide the Supreme Court, with many of 
the most significant rulings being plurality opinions. Among the 
most prominent examples are the plurality opinions in Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services87 and Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.88 Recent abortion cases such 
as Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart suggest a growing willingness 
of the Court to recognize and weigh multiple state interests in 
assessing the constitutionality of an abortion regulation.  
In Stenberg v. Carhart,89 Justice Kennedy emphasized that 
Casey held it was “inappropriate for the Judicial Branch to 
provide an exhaustive list of state interests implicated by 
abortion” and that “Casey is premised on the states having an 
important constitutional role in defining their interests in the 
abortion debate.”90 In Gonzales, Justice Kennedy described the 
state’s interest in the protection of fetal life as substantial at all 
points: “Casey struck a balance that was central to its holding, 
and the Court applies Casey’s standard here. A central premise of 
Casey’s joint opinion . . . [is] that the government has a 
                                                                                                     
 85. Brief for American Colleges of Obstetricians & Gynecologists & 
American Congress of Obstetricians & Gynecologists as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3–4, Isaacson v. Horne, 884 F. Supp. 2d 961 
(D. Ariz. 2012), rev’d, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 86. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 
U.S. 747, 778 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he State’s interest in the 
protection of an embryo . . . increases progressively and dramatically as the 
organism’s capacity to feel pains, to experience pleasure, to survive, and to react 
to its surroundings increases day by day.”). 
 87. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 88. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
 89. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 90. Id. at 961 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
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legitimate, substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal 
life . . . .”91  
In Gonzales, the Court upheld the federal Partial Birth 
Abortion Ban Act, which made no distinction based on viability: 
“The Act does apply both previability and postviability because, 
by common understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus is a 
living organism while within the womb, whether or not it is 
viable outside the womb.”92 Justice Kennedy, author of the 
majority opinion, emphasized the State’s interest in protecting 
the fetus: “Casey struck a balance that was central to its holding, 
and the Court applies Casey’s standard here. A central premise of 
Casey’s joint opinion . . . [is] that the government has a 
legitimate, substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal 
life . . . .”93  
Recognition of a compelling state interest in the protection of 
pain-capable unborn children does not require the Court to reject 
a woman’s liberty interest in obtaining an abortion or the 
balancing framework of Casey—it only asks the Court to 
recognize the legislature’s ability to weigh and rely upon new 
scientific evidence supporting a strong state interest in regulating 
abortions at twenty weeks’ gestation. Even former U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice Stevens, who during his tenure on the Court 
repeatedly voted to strike down abortion regulations, listed the 
“organism’s capacity to feel pain” as a ground on the basis of 
which “the State’s interest in the protection of an embryo . . . 
increases progressively and dramatically.”94 He noted that “[t]he 
development of a fetus—and pregnancy itself—are not static 
conditions, and the assertion that the government’s interest is 
static simply ignores this reality.”95  
These statements all suggest possible movement away from 
viability as the sole constitutional marker of legislative power to 
limit abortions, and toward a more nuanced and balanced 
                                                                                                     
 91. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 126 (2007). 
 92. Id. at 147. 
 93. Id. at 126.  
 94. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747, 778 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 95. Id. at 778. 
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approach that would include consideration of the unborn child’s 
pain. 
VI. Responding to the Claim that Late Abortions Are Too Few to 
Be of Concern 
Some opponents of Pain-Capable Child Protection Acts argue 
that the legislation is unnecessary given the small percentage of 
abortions occurring after the first trimester of pregnancy.96 While 
it is true that the percentage of abortions occurring at or after 
twenty weeks in the pregnancy is relatively small,97 the issue is 
not insignificant. Twenty-three percent of all abortion providers 
in the United States offer abortions at twenty weeks.98 In 2009, of 
the 1.21 million abortions performed in the United States, more 
than 18,000 were performed after twenty-one weeks’ gestation.99  
In any context other than abortion, 18,000 lost lives would 
generate massive federal and state efforts to prevent these 
deaths. Two examples illustrate this point. An estimated 15,529 
people with an AIDS diagnosis died in 2010.100 In that same year 
the federal government spent $19.6 billion for HIV/AIDS care, 
housing, prevention, and research.101 For 2014 the President 
proposed to increase domestic HIV/AIDS funding to $23.2 
billion.102 
                                                                                                     
 96. Engelman, supra note 11, at 311. 
 97. See GUTTMACHER INST., FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2 (2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.pdf 
(reporting that 1.2% of all abortions in 2010 were performed at or after twenty-
one weeks gestation). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (describing the low 
percentage of abortions performed after twenty-one weeks gestation). 
 100. HIV in the United States: At a Glance, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/statistics/basics/ataglance.html (last 
updated Dec. 3, 2013) (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 101. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FACT SHEET: U.S. FEDERAL 
FUNDING FOR HIV/AIDS: THE PRESIDENT’S FY 2014 BUDGET REQUEST tbl.1 (2013), 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/7029-tables-1-2-feder 
al-funding-for-hivaids-the-presidents-fy2014-budget-request.pdf.  
 102. Id. 
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Drunk driving laws and government prevention programs 
provide another example of substantial government efforts to 
save a small number of lives. According to the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, 10,322 people were killed in 
alcohol-impaired-driving crashes in 2012.103 Federal and state 
laws criminalize alcohol-impaired driving and state participation 
in federal transportation funding is conditioned upon various 
educational and enforcement efforts to prevent these deaths.104  
Many Americans believe that saving 18,000 unborn children 
from pain is as important as saving the 15,000 AIDS patients or 
the 10,000 victims of drunk driving, and well worth the effort to 
pass, enforce, and defend Pain-Capable Child Protection Acts.105 
VII. Conclusion 
If there is a single issue in the abortion debate where 
common ground could be found, one would hope it might be on 
the issue of protecting the unborn from the pain of abortion by 
limiting abortions at twenty weeks or later to cases in which the 
mother’s life or physical health is at stake. Legislatures in 
thirteen states have enacted laws that say that babies cannot be 
                                                                                                     
 103. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: 2012 
DATA 1 (2013), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811870.pdf. 
 104. See, e.g., Drunk Drivers: Congress Gets Behind Breath-Test Ignition 
Devices, NATION NOW (Jan. 31, 2012, 3.28 PM), http://latimesblogs. 
latimes.com/nationnow/2012/01/bill-to-target-drunk-drivers-gains-support-but-
other-battles-lay-ahead-over-next-roads-measure-.html (last visited Jan. 31, 
2014) (“A House transportation bill unveiled Tuesday would offer additional 
highway funds to states that require ignition interlock devices for DUI 
offenders.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 105. See Dave Andrusko, Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act 
Remains National Right to Life’s Top Legislative Priority, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE 
NEWS TODAY, http://www.nationalrighttolifenews.org/news/2014/01/pain-cap 
able-unborn-child-protection-act-remains-national-right-to-lifes-top-legislative-
priority/#.UuKAJBb0Ay4 (last updated Jan. 14, 2014) (last visited Jan. 24, 
2014) 
In a nationwide poll of 1,003 registered voters in March, The Polling 
Company found that 64% would support a law such as the Pain-
Capable Unborn Child Protection Act prohibiting abortion after 20 
weeks—when an unborn baby can feel pain—unless the life of the 
mother is in danger. Only 30% opposed such legislation. 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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aborted from the point that substantial medical evidence 
demonstrates the child can feel pain—twenty weeks.106 Pain-
Capable Child Protection Acts are innovative only insofar as the 
legislation relies upon scientific evidence establishing the unborn 
child’s capacity to feel pain at twenty weeks’ gestation and 
concludes that the acquisition of this capacity makes that child 
sufficiently like the rest of us to mark a tipping point—a tipping 
point at which it becomes constitutional for states to restrict 
abortion to cases involving pregnancies that pose a threat to the 
mother’s life or substantial impairment of a major bodily 
function. The evidence of the unborn child’s pain was not 
available to the U.S. Supreme Court when it created the 
constitutional right to abortion in 1973. Both pro-life and pro-
choice justices have acknowledged the relevance of pain in 
adjudicating abortion cases.107 It is time for the Court to review 
the evidence and adjust its constitutional jurisprudence to reflect 
the medical reality of fetal pain and respect the state’s right to 
intervene and protect the child.  
  
                                                                                                     
 106. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (listing the thirteen state 
statutes). 
 107. See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text (discussing opinions of 
Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens). 
